THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE AND COLONIALISM: REASONS FOR AFRICA’S UNDERDEVELOPMENT? by Ojo, Emmanuel Oladipo
European Scientific Journal June 2015 edition vol.11, No.17  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
107 
THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE AND 





Emmanuel Oladipo Ojo, PhD 
Department of History & International Studies,  




 It is probably an understatement to assert that Africa, the world’s 
second largest continent, is underdeveloped compared with other continents. 
Two major exogenous factors often cited for Africa’s development crisis are 
the so called ‘dual historical injustices’ – the Atlantic slave trade and 
colonialism. It is often pointed out that while the former almost completely 
arrested and retarded Africa’s demographical growth for more than three 
centuries, evoked a perennial state of acrimony and warfare and created a 
tense and unprecedented atmosphere of insecurity which hindered economic 
activities and stifled local entrepreneurship and technological drive and 
dislocated Africa’s socio-economic and political structures and institutions; 
the latter tied African countries to the apron strings of western imperial 
powers thereby rendering the pre-conditions necessary for socio-economic 
and political transformation unachievable. This paper contends that while the 
history of Africa’s underdevelopment may be traceable to the Atlantic slave 
trade and colonialism, African leaders had made enormous contributions to 
the continent’s underdevelopment and backwardness. The paper concludes 
that irresponsible and irresponsive leadership, vampirism and prodigality, 
corruption, lack of respect for democratic ideals, insecurity, endemic civil 






 Africa is the lowest income region in the world.1 This paper revisits 
the issue of the continent’s chronic underdevelopment and backwardness in 
                                                          
1 P. Collier and  J.W. Gunning “Why Has Africa Grown Slowly?” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 13(3), 1999, p.3. 
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the comity of world’s continents. Although, endowed with enormous and 
almost inexhaustible human and natural resources, Africa lags behind the 
other continents in every facet of life – economically, technically, politically 
and technologically. With a total land area of approximately 30,221,532 sq. 
km, Africa is about 20.4% of global landmass and is home to more than 1 
billion people – about 15% of global population. Africa is home to 50% of 
world’s gold; most of the world’s diamond and chromium; 90% of the 
cobalt; 40% of the world’s potential hydroelectric power; 65% of the 
manganese; millions of acres of fertile and uncultivated farmland and 
abundance of gas and crude oil. Yet the continent is home to the world’s 
most impoverished, famished, uneducated and mal-nourished people.2 In 
most African countries, public utilities are perpetually comatose thereby 
forcing Africans to live under the most incredibly horrifying socio-
economic conditions. Thus, in the failed state index published in 2010, 
Africa had 7 of the top slots and almost half of the 60 economically weak 
states in the world.3 Since the most important functions of the state are 
poverty reduction, territorial control, safety and security, capacity to manage 
public resources, delivery of basic services and the ability to protect and 
support the ways in which the poorest people sustain themselves; failed 
states are “governments that cannot or will not deliver core functions to the 
majority of its people, including the poor”. 4 This means that failed states are 
states that are unable to provide their citizens with basic necessities like 
health care, security, employment and good infrastructures. It is therefore 
not surprising that in its 2010 Report, the Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace 
categorised majority of African states as failed states.5     
 Probably with the exception of Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory 
Coast (Côte d’Ivoire), virtually all first generation post-independence 
African leaders attributed the socio-economic and political failure of the 
                                                          
2 Stanley Igwe, How Africa Underdeveloped Africa (Port Harcourt: Prime Print 
Technologies, 2012), p. viii; “The Failure of African Leadership: Causes of Africa’s 
Problem” retrieved from http://www.africanholocaust.net and 
http://www.blatantworld.com/data/the-largest-continents. Both sites were accessed 
on 20 November 2014.  
3 Stephen Ekokobe Awung, A Critical Analysis of Underdevelopment in Africa.  
Failed States and Reasons for Social Unrest in Africa (n.d, n.p., 2011), p. 2. 
4 Ibid 
5 See Failed State Index online at 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/2010_failed_states_index. This 
site was accessed on 15 January 2015.   
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continent to the Atlantic slave trade and colonialism.6 For example, 
President Sékou Touré of Guinea asserted that “Africa’s level of 
development is a product of the economic conditions brought about by 
foreign intervention and domination”.7 In their own assessment of 
colonialism, Malian leaders insisted that apart from the Office du Niger, a 
gigantic agricultural project, French colonialism contributed nothing to 
Mali. According to them, “...in public works, health, power, transportation, 
education and the general infrastructure, Mali made almost no progress 
under French control”.8 In the same vein, Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria 
submitted that “slavery played its shameful role in depopulating Africa; 
capitalism denuded it of its wealth; colonialism deprived it of its birthright 
and imperialism emasculated its will to live as a human being [sic] and to 
enjoy its fair share of the bounties of the good earth”.9 Indeed, Léopold 
Senghor of Senegal dismissed the Atlantic slave trade and colonialism as 
“economies of slavery”.10  
 In contemporary times, Wole Soyinka averred that Africa’s 
underdevelopment is the outcome of “the twin evils of slavery and 
colonialism inflicted by the Western world”.11  According to him, slavery 
and colonialism are two monumental historical events that dislocated Africa 
and aborted the continent’s social, political, economic and technological 
development.12  At the 2012 World Summit on Sustainable Development 
held in Johannesburg, African leaders took turn to blame the Atlantic slave 
trade and colonialism for Africa’s development tragedy. Several scholars 
have also expressed the view that the Atlantic slave trade is responsible for 
                                                          
6 A not-very-popular but probably profound cause of Africa’s underdevelopment as 
pointed out by a scholar is the prevalence of malaria fever. Advancing reasons for 
Africa’s underdevelopment, Sambit Bhattacharyya argued that malaria “matters the 
most and all other factors are statistically insignificant”. See his “Root of African 
Underdevelopment”, Journal of African Economies, Vol. 18(5), 2009, p. 745.    
7 Sékou Touré, “Africa’s Future and the World”, Foreign Affairs, XLI, October 
1962, pp. 145-146. 
8 Quoted from Kenneth W. Grundy, “African Explanations of Underdevelopment: 
The Theoretical Basis for Political Action”, The Review of Politics, Vol. 28, No. 1. 
January 1966, p. 65. 
9 Nnamdi Azikiwe, “The Future of Pan-Africanism”, Présence Africaine XII, First 
Quarter, 1962, p. 7. 
10 Léopold Sédar Senghor, “A Community of Free and Equal Peoples with the 
Mother Country”, Western World, No. 18, October 1958, p. 40. 
11  “Slavery, Colonialism – Responsible for Africa’s Underdevelopment”, ThisDay, 
23 December 2012. 
12 Gbenga Adeniji “Slavery, colonialism haunting Africa – Soyinka”, Punch, 19 
December, 2012. 
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Africa’s socio-economic inertial, political ineptitude, technological 
backwardness and sundry dislocations. The most prominent of these 
scholars is probably Nathan Nunn who has attempted to show the link 
between the slave trade, the legacy of extractive colonial institutions and 
Africa’s underdevelopment. According to him, “recent studies have found 
evidence linking Africa’s current under-development to colonial rule and 
slave trade.”13 Indeed, the present article is a critique of Nathan’s 
submission that “one...explanation for Africa’s underdevelopment is its 
history of extraction characterized by two events: the slave trades and 
colonialism...the African countries that are the poorest today are the ones 
from which the most slaves were taken”.14 This agrees with Walter 
Rodney’s submission that the principal agencies of Africa’s 
underdevelopment over the past five centuries are the slave trade and 
colonialism.15 From the above, it becomes immediately clear that the 
dependency theory to which reference will be made later is a very popular 
explanation for Africa’s underdevelopment.    
 
The Impact of the Atlantic Slave Trade and Colonialism on Africa 
 There is no paucity of literature on the consequences of the Atlantic 
slave trade and colonialism on Africa.16 Historians and scholars in allied 
disciplines have documented the impact of the trade on African institutions 
as well as those of Europe and the New World. Particular attention had 
indeed been paid to how the Atlantic slave trade pillaged Africa and 
prospered Europe and the Americas so that till date, as far as many African 
leaders and some scholars are concerned, the slave trade and colonialism 
remain the most profound factors in the history of Africa’s 
underdevelopment. The reasons for the above position are obvious. This 
                                                          
13 Nathan Nunn, “Historical Legacies: A Model caineLinking Africa’s Past to its 
Current Underdevelopment”, Journal of Development Economics, 83(1), 2007, p. 
145. Some of his other works include “The Slave Trade and Origins of Mistrust in 
Africa”, American Economic Review, 101(7), 2011, pp. 3221-3252; “Shackled to 
the Past: The Causes and Consequences of Africa’s Slave Trades” in J. Diamond & 
J.A. Robinson, Natural Experiments of History (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2010), pp. 142-184 
14 Nathan Nunn, “The Long Term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades”, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 123(1), 2008, pp. 139-140.   
15 Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Abuja: Panaf Publishing 
Inc., 2009), p. viii. 
16 For a concise examination of the impact of the Atlantic slave trade on Africa, 
Europe and the New World, see Will Hardy, “Riches and Misery: The 
Consequences of the Atlantic Slave Trade” at Open Learn – 
http://www.open.edu/openlearn. This site was accessed on 25 January 2015. 
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paper does not intend to attempt a detailed examination of the consequences 
of both the slave trade and colonialism on Africa since there are dozens of 
such studies,17 it will therefore only summarise the impact of these two 
historical phenomena on Africa and proceed to attempt a detailed 
examination of the contributions of African leaders to the underdevelopment 
of the continent. 
                                                          
17 Some of these are Joseph E. Inikori (ed.), Forced Migration: The Impact of the 
Export Slave Trade on African Societies (London: Hutchinson, 1982); Joseph 
Inikori et. al. The Atlantic Slave Trade – Trade Effects on Economies, Societies and 
Peoples in Africa, the Americas and Europe (Duke University Press, 1980); Philip 
D. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1969); Philip D. Curtin, ed., Africa Remembered: Narratives of West Africans 
from the Era of the Slave Trade (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967); 
Philip D. Curtin, Economic Change in Pre-colonial Africa: Senegambia in the Era 
of the Slave Trade (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1975); Philip D. 
Curtin, The Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex. Essays in Atlantic History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); E. Akyeampong et. al., Africa’s 
Development in Historical Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2014); Adamu, Mahdi, "The Delivery of Slaves from the Bight of Benin in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries," in H.A. Gemery and J.S. Hogendorn (eds.), 
The Uncommon Market: Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic Slave Trade 
(New York; Academic Press, 1979); Kwame Daaku, Trade and Politics on the Gold 
Coast 1600- 1720: A study of the African Reaction to European Trade (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1970); Albert Dantzig, “Effect of the Atlantic Slave Trade on some 
West African Societies," Revue francaise d'histoire d'outre-mer, 62:1-2 (1975); 
David Eltis, “The Volume and Structure of the Transatlantic Slave Trade: A 
Reassessment”, William and Mary Quarterly, 58, 1 (2001); Olaudah Equiano, 
Olaudah Equiano: The Interesting Narrative and Other Writings (Vincent Carretta, 
ed.) (New York: Penguin Books, 1995); J.D. Fage, “Slaves and Society in Western 
Africa. c.1445-c.1700,” Journal of African History 21, 3 (1980); John Thornton, 
Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400-1800 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University, 2nd ed., 1998); Walter Rodney, “Slavery and other forms of 
social oppression on the Upper Guinea Coast in the context of the Atlantic slave 
trade”, Journal of African History, 7, 4 (1966); Walter Rodney, “Upper Guinea  and 
the Significance of the Origins of  Africans  Enslaved  in the New World”, The 
Journal of Negro History, 1969,Vol. 54, No. 4; Joseph Miller. “Central Africa 
During the Era of the Slave Trade, c. 1490s-1850s” in Linda Heywood, ed., Central 
Africans and Cultural Transformations in the American Diaspora (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001); Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson, 
“Competing Markets for Male and Female Slaves: Slave Prices in the Interior of 
West Africa, 1780-1850”, International Journal of African Historical Studies 28:2 
(1995); Paul E. Lovejoy “The Impact of the Atlantic Slave Trade on Africa: A 
Review of the Literature”, Journal of African History, 30 (1989) and Paul E. 
Lovejoy, ed. Africans in Bondage (Madison: African Studies Program, 1986). 
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 Let us begin our summary with the demographical changes brought 
about by the slave trade. Between the 1400s when Portuguese ships arrived 
African shores and c.1870, the African continent experienced four slave 
trades the most extensive and celebrated being the Trans-Atlantic slave trade 
through which slaves were shipped from West Africa, West Central Africa 
and Eastern Africa to the European colonies in the New World.18 One 
profound impact of the slave trade on Africa is depopulation. Although, 
while the general destructiveness of the slave trade on Africa’s socio-
economic and political structures and institutions remain clear, the question 
of the number of Africans transported across the Atlantic remains a subject 
of speculation and debate with estimates ranging from a few millions to 
over a hundred million.19 Paul Lovejoy estimates that about 11,863,000 
Africans landed alive in the Americas and elsewhere during the slave 
trade.20 This was in addition to the several millions who died in the ‘Middle 
Passage’21 as well as those who died between the time of capture and 
embarkation most especially in cases where slaves had to travel hundreds of 
miles to the coast. For every 100 slaves who reached the New World, 
another 40 had probably died in Africa or during the infamous Middle 
Passage. As Rodney has pointed out, particular reference must be made to 
the manner and circumstances in which slaves were obtained for sale and 
shipment. Evidently, the principal means of obtaining slaves was warfare. 
                                                          
18 The other three were the Trans-Saharan, the Red Sea and Indian Ocean slave 
trades which removed more than 6 million Africans from their homelands. See 
Nathan Nunn, “The Long Term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades”, The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, February 2008, p. 142.      
19 For example, Paul Lovejoy estimates that about 11,863,000 Africans crossed the 
Atlantic. See his “The Impact of the Atlantic Slave Trade on Africa: A Review of 
the Literature”, Journal of African History, Vol. 30, No. 3, 1989, p. 368. 
20 Paul Lovejoy, ibid,  p. 367. 
21 Estevan Hernańdez estimates that approximately 1.2 – 2.4 million Africans died 
in the Middle Passage. See his “The Colonial Underdevelopment of Africa by 
Europe and the United States”, Liberation, 30 November 2014 retrieved from 
http://www.liberationnews.org on 12 January 2015. British sailors coined this 
innocuous phrase the ‘Middle Passage’ to describe the ‘middle leg’ of a triangular 
journey first from England to Africa, then from Africa to Americas, and finally 
from the Americas back to England. On the first leg of their trip, slave traders 
delivered goods from European ports to Africa. On the ‘middle’ leg, ship captains 
such as John Newton, loaded their then-empty holds with slaves and transported 
them to the Americas and the Caribbean. A typical Atlantic crossing took 60-90 
days but some lasted up to four months. Upon arrival, captains sold the slaves and 
purchased raw materials which they took back to Europe on the last leg of the trip. 
See Darlene Clark Hine et. al., The African-American Odyssey (New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 2003), particularly chapter two entitled ‘Middle Passage’, pp. 24-45. 
European Scientific Journal June 2015 edition vol.11, No.17  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
113 
This meant that millions may had been killed or maimed in hundreds of 
thousands of slave-raiding inspired wars all over the continent.22 The 
addition of all the above would yield a startlingly higher figure – many 
times the millions that actually landed in the New World and elsewhere. 
 Although, the absence of data about the size of Africa’s population 
in the 15th century makes a categorical, definitive, scientific and systematic 
analysis of the impact of the Atlantic slave trade on Africa a bit hazardous; 
there seems to be no doubt that Africa’s demographical changes were in the 
deficit throughout the slave trade era. This was because fewer babies were 
born than would have been the case had millions of child-bearing Africans 
not been killed in slave-hunting wars or removed from their homelands.23 
The following population estimates (in millions), given by a European 
scholar, support the above view  
Continent Population (1650) Population (1750) Population (1850) Population (1900) 
Africa 100 100 100 120 
Europe 103 144 274 423 
Asia 257 437 656 857 
Source: Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, p. 111. 
 
 As conjectural as these figures might be, they clearly demonstrate 
Africa’s abnormal and deficit demographical changes. While the population 
of Europe more than tripled between 1650 and 1900 apparently because of 
inflow of millions of slaves from Africa; that of the latter stagnated and 
increased by only 20% thus corroborating the assertion that the population 
of Africa remained stagnant until the end of the 19th century. The slave trade 
remains the most plausible explanation for this stagnated population growth. 
Indeed, the above population estimates corroborate the view expressed by 
Patrick Manning that “by 1850, Africa’s population was only half of what it 
would have been had the slave trades not taken place”.24   
 For more than three centuries, the Atlantic slave trade evoked a 
perennial state of acrimony and created a tense and unprecedented 
atmosphere of insecurity which hindered economic activities and stifled 
local entrepreneurship and technological drive which in turn distorted 
Africa’s socio-economic structures and dislocated her political institutions. 
Development as the capacity for self-sustaining growth is a many-sided 
process which is achievable only when other variables – for example a 
tranquil atmosphere – are present. For more than three centuries, the 
                                                          
22 Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, p. 110. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Patrick Manning, Slavery and African Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), p. 171. 
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Atlantic slave trade engendered wars and other chaotic situations which 
were at cross-purposes with development. As Rodney has pointed out, the 
relationship between Africa and Europe from the 15th century onwards 
served to block the spirit of technological innovation both directly and 
indirectly.25 In the first place, millions of young men and women, the agents 
of development, were removed from Africa thereby robbing the continent of 
the mental and physical contributions of millions of potential talents, 
supporters, anchors and sponsors of Africa’s development. In addition, 
those who escaped being captured by slave raiders lived in perpetual fear 
and apprehension and were pre-occupied devising safety stratagems and 
precautions – this took the farmer away from his farm, the blacksmith from 
the furnace, the carpenter from his workshop, the dyer from the dyewood, 
etc. thus dealing devastating blows to social, economic and technological 
take off of Africa since “the buoyancy or depression of the 
economy...depend on the peace or warfare in the land”.26 As Lovejoy has 
pointed out, “many [African] communities relocated as far from the slavers’ 
route as possible. In the process, their technological and economic 
development was hindered as they devoted their energy to hiding and 
defending themselves”.27 Agriculture, which guarantees food production, is 
a sine qua non to development because with it, population stabilizes and 
enlarges and specialization, industrialization and urbanization take place. In 
removing millions of able-bodied men and women from Africa, the Atlantic 
slave trade knocked off the premise of Africa’s development. With 
particular reference to the Gold Coast (Ghana), Washington Alcott 
summarised the economic impact of the Atlantic slave trade thus: 
The transatlantic slave trade caused the forced removal 
from Africa millions of Africans. This number included 
a large percentage of skilled tradesman and women 
from a range of occupations and professions who were 
making their contribution to African societies...Slave 
trading undermined the Gold Coast economy and 
destroyed the gold trade. Slave raiding and kidnapping 
made it unsafe to mine the gold or to travel with gold. 
The Europeans’ demand for slaves made raiding for 
captives more profitable than gold mining. The 
                                                          
25 Walter Rodney, p. 122. 
26 Deji Ogunremi “Foundations of the Yoruba Economy in the Pre-Colonial Era” in 
Deji Ogunremi and `Biodun Adediran (eds.). Culture and Society in Yorunaland 
(Ibadan: Rex Charles Publications, 1998), p. 113. 
27 Paul E. Lovejoy, International Slave Trade: Causes and Consequences (New 
York: York University Press, 1974), p. 65. 
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transatlantic slave trade encouraged Africans to wage 
war against one another and conduct raids instead of 
building more peaceful links.28 
 Washington’s submission is true of the entire continent. Scholars 
appear to agree that the Atlantic slave trade rendered Africa amenable to 
colonialism. This is not surprising given the fact that the human society, 
structurally and functionally, is almost a replica of the human body which 
remains immune to sicknesses and viral attacks as long as antibodies are 
unassailable, active and strong and vice versa. Strong and efficient socio-
economic institutions or what Anta Diop refers to as ‘productive forces’29 
are the antibodies of the human society which protect the human society 
from attacks when they are strong and render it amenable to sundry assaults 
when they are weak, ill-developed or non-existent. Having drained Africa of 
millions of men and women in their productive ages and created 
unfavourable conditions for socio-economic and political growth, “in the 
end, the slave trade left the continent underdeveloped, disorganized and 
vulnerable to the next phase of European hegemony – colonialism”.30 This 
line of argument obviously led Patrick Manning to the conclusion that 
“there is no doubt that a large number of negative structural features of the 
process of economic underdevelopment [of Africa] have historical roots 
going back to European colonization”.31 This agrees with the view 
expressed by Claude Ake that “It was mainly because the development of 
productive forces stagnated at a certain stage in African history that the 
colonisers were able to subordinate the continent”.32  Indeed, the Chinese 
Marxist theorist, Mao Tse Tung (1893-1976) held the view that 
“colonialism and imperialism was built on the enslavement of Negroes and 
the trade in Negroes”.33 Between 1830, when France invaded Algeria and 
1914, when the First World War broke out, virtually all parts of Africa had 
been colonised.  
                                                          
28 Washington Alcott, “The Underdevelopment of Africa by Europe”, Revealing 
Histories, retrieved at http://www.revealinghistories.org.uk/africa on 4th February 
2015.   
29 Cheikh Anta Diop, Pre-Colonial Black Africa (Westport: Lawrence Hill & 
Company, 1987), p. 158. 
30 Paul E. Lovejoy, International Slave Trade: Causes and Consequences, p.  88. 
31 Patrick Manning, Slavery and African Life, p 124. 
32 Calude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa (Essex: Longman, 1981), p. 11. 
33 Quoted from Yusufu Bala Usman “History and Its Challenges to the Peoples and 
Polities of Africa in the 21st Century” in C.B.N. Ogbogbo & O.O. Okpeh, 
Interrogating Contemporary Africa – Dike Memorial Lectures, 1999-2007 (Ibadan: 
Historical Society of Nigeria, 2008), p. 2. 
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 By 1935, colonialism had been fastened on Africa like a steel  grid. 
As has been pointed out already, this paper does not intend to attempt a 
detailed analysis of the origins and course of either the Atlantic slave trade 
or colonialism. Since there are dozens of specialised and excellent studies 
on the phases, course and consequences of western European colonial 
ventures in Africa,34 all that is attempted here is a brief and general outline 
of the impact of colonialism on Africa. It must be pointed out however that 
the most cursory glance at extant literature on the impact of colonialism on 
Africa reveals divergent opinions ranging from the one-sided view of 
apologists like P.C. Lloyd,35 D.K. Fieldhouse,36 Grover Clark,37 Margaret 
Perham38 and L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan39 who described colonialism as 
absolute blessing for Africa to the extreme critic like Walter Rodney who 
dismissed colonialism as a one-armed bandit. Adu Boahem has attempted a 
concise, succinct and balanced analysis of the impact of colonialism on 
Africa. According to him, colonialism bequeathed three positive political 
legacies to Africa. First, it established a greater degree of sustained peace 
and stability in Africa than before. Boahem recounts that the 19th century 
was the century of Mfecane and the activities of the Swahili-Arab and 
Nyamweze traders such as Tipu Tip and Msiri in central and southern 
Africa; of the Fulani jihadists and the rise of the Tukulor and Mandigo in 
the western Sudan; the disintegration of the Oyo and Asante Empires in 
West Africa, which caused a great deal of instability and insecurity.40 
However, “after the colonial occupation and the establishment of various 
administrative machineries, most parts of Africa, especially from the end of 
the First World War onwards, enjoyed a great degree of continuous peace 
and security”.41   
                                                          
34 For a comprehensive discussion of the impact of colonialism on Africa, see 
Patrick Ziltener and Daniel Künzler, “Impacts of Colonialism – A Research 
Survey”, Journal of World–Systems Research, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2013, pp. 290-311.  
35 P.C. Lloyd, Africa in Social Change (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972). 
36 D.K. Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the 
Eighteenth Century (Lodon: Macmillan, 1982). 
37 Grover Clark, The Balance Sheets of Imperialism: Facts and Figures on Colonies 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1936). 
38 Margaret Perham, Mining, Commerce and Finance in Nigeria (Faber: London, 
1948). 
39 L.H. Gann and P. Duignan (eds.), Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1970). 
40 Albert Adu Boahem, “The Colonial Heritage in Africa” (Action for Peace and 
Development Project), 2011, p. 1. 
41 Albert Adu Boahem, “The Colonial Heritage in Africa”, op. cit. 
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 The second positive colonial legacy in Africa identified by Boahem 
is the emergence of geo-polities. In the place of the hundreds of autonomous 
clans, lineages, groups, city-states, kingdoms and empires with no clear-cut 
and well-defined boundaries, were established fifty new states with, in most 
cases, fixed and clearly demarcated boundaries.42 It is worthy of note that till 
date the boundaries of many African states remain as defined during the 
colonial period. It must be conceded however that many of these geo-
political entities were mere artificial creations consisting of a motley and 
medley of peoples with different and sometimes conflicting traditions, 
origins, languages, cultures, etc thereby making many of them enforced 
associations of incompatibles thus imposing herculean post-independence 
challenges on them. This is quite apart from the fact that these geo-polities 
differed widely in land mass and demography. For example, of the fifty-four 
countries in Africa, only five – Nigeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, South Africa and 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo – have populations that are over 20 
million; six – Morocco, Algeria, Tanzania, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda – 
have populations that are more than 10 million while about 34 others have 
populations that are below 2 million each.43 Lastly, colonialism led to the 
introduction of two important institutions – a new judicial system and 
bureaucracy (civil service).   
 It was perhaps in the sphere of economy that colonialism was almost 
a bare-faced robber. Indeed, whatever colonialism contributed to political 
mobilization in Africa it took away in economic demobilization. Prior to the 
imposition of colonial rule, “African economies were advancing in every 
area, particularly in the area of trade”44 but since the primary objective of 
colonialism was the exploitation of the physical, human and economic 
resources of the colonised, it encouraged and ensured the development of a 
commodity-based trading system, a cash crop agriculture system and a trade 
network that linked the total economic output of Africa to the twists, turns 
and tastes of the metropolitan economies. Prior to the imposition of colonial 
rule on Africa, local production provided Africans with a variety of 
consumer goods; colonialism however forced the demise of the industrial 
sector and created an overwhelming reliance on imported goods from 
Europe. Indeed, “the technological gap between Africa and Europe, 
                                                          
42 Ibid. 
43 Ajagbe T. Oyewo, “Examination of the Root Causes of Unsustainable 
Development in Africa”, Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, Vol. 16, 
No. 4, 2014, p. 45. 
44 Joshua D. Settles, “The Impact of Colonialism on African Economic 
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confined in the 15th century to shipping and firearms, widened to such an 
extent that African technology failed to progress”.45 It has been pointed out 
that between 1946 and 1956, the Colonial Development and Welfare Funds 
allocated less than 1% of its funds to the industrial sector.46 The calculated 
and deliberate stifling of Africa’s industrial sector by colonial authorities 
informed the conclusion that “had native industries been encouraged and 
cultivated by the colonizing powers, Africa would probably be in a much 
better economic and technological position today”.47 Obviously, the most 
outstanding feature of the colonial economy was disarticulation.48 A 
disarticulated economy is one whose parts or sectors are not complimentary 
having neither vertical nor horizontal linkages that can stimulate growth or 
propel demand and supply or improved production and distribution 
methods. The colonising powers disarticulated the African economy in an 
attempt to ensure that the continent remained a permanent supplier of raw 
materials to European industries and perpetual consumers of finished 
products from same.  
 Apologists of colonialism often assert that overseas possessions 
were burdensome to the metropoles and that the latter made huge financial 
investments which, to a very large extent, stabilised and vitalised African 
economy but which, on the whole, did not yield commensurate economic 
dividends for the metropolitan economies. It should be pointed out that the 
colonisers could not exploit the resources and wealth of the colonies at no 
cost at all. Thus, in some cases, the extraction of the resources of the 
colonies entailed some measure of superficial investment in infrastructure 
particularly railways, roads, water resources, electrical power and 
administrative structures. Consequently, the infrastructures provided were 
neither adequate nor targeted at the overall development of the African 
economy since they were ‘accidental discharges’ and not products of 
deliberate, coordinated and conscious planning. This is not surprising given 
the purpose and nature of colonialism/imperialism whose primary purpose 
was the subjugation, domination, oppression and exploitation of other 
people.49 Viewed from any angle, it would appear that the Atlantic slave 
trade and colonialism were double jeopardy for Africa’s economy little 
                                                          
45 Peter Wickins, An Economic History of Africa – From the Earliest Times to 
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wonder then that the underdevelopment of the continent has been hinged on 
these so-called dual historical injustices.  
 
The Role of the Atlantic Slave Trade and Colonialism in the 
Underdevelopment of Africa: A Reassessment 
 The exact meaning of ‘development’ in the terrain of development 
studies has been plagued with intense controversy as there are a galore of 
definitions propounded by various scholars to capture the meaning of 
development and underdevelopment from their respective perspectives and 
ideological leanings and orientations. Torado and Smith define development 
as “a multi dimensional process involving major changes in social structures, 
popular attitudes and national institutions as well as the acceleration of 
economic growth, the reduction of inequality and eradication of poverty”.50 
This paper conceives development as qualitative and quantitative 
improvement in people’s living standards in all aspects of human endeavour 
which includes improved education, incomes, skills development and 
adequate access to information, good infrastructural facilities, decent housing 
for the populace, and employment opportunities in the modern sector. The 
reverse of the above explains underdevelopment. From the outline of the 
impact of the Atlantic slave trade and colonialism presented above, it is 
obvious that the Atlantic slave trade and colonialism arrested the political 
and economic development of Africa. At this juncture, a brief commentary 
on the internal causation (or modernization) theory and external causation (or 
dependency) theory of underdevelopment might be helpful.51 Proponents of 
the internal causation theory of underdevelopment argue that a nation’s lack 
of development is a result of its failure to utilize its resources to stimulate 
economic growth and the failure of the state to establish the required 
institutional structures, frameworks and mechanisms that can drive and 
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propel development.52 W. Rostow, one of the most celebrated protagonists of 
the internal causation theory postulates five stages of growth: first the 
traditional society whose features include limited production structure and 
technology; second, the precondition for take-off in which society gets ready 
for transformation by exploring new production techniques and engages in 
industrial production; third is the take-off stage which is characterized by a 
rapid and continuous growth in agriculture and industry; four   the drive of 
maturity stage characterized by the development of modern technology and 
lastly the stage of mass consumption wherein real income per person 
increases resulting in high standard of living.53  
 On the other hand, proponents of the external causation theory 
explain underdevelopment in terms of external factors that inhibited a 
country’s development. Andre Gunder Frank, the most celebrated 
representative of this school of thought, argues that underdevelopment does 
not emanate from absence of requisite growth-stimulating domestic 
institutional structures or lack of other developmental requirements, but 
rather a direct consequence of political subjugation and economic 
exploitation.54 According to this theory, the underdevelopment of 
underdeveloped states is the outcome of the unequal and unfavourable 
conditions they found themselves in in the world capitalist system. In a 
nutshell, the main thrust of the dependency school of thought in expatiating 
development or underdevelopment discourse centres on core-periphery 
relationship in the world capitalist system and how the system stifled 
development in the peripheral states. The implication of the dependency 
theory is that exogamous factors – the Atlantic slave trade, colonialism, neo-
colonialism, etc – played no roles in the underdevelopment of states while 
that of external causation theory presupposes that endogamous factors like 
corruption, insecurity, civil strives, etc are not or cannot be responsible for 
underdevelopment. It seems immediately clear to an objective mind that 
these theories are both narrow and extreme – to acquiesce to either of them is 
tantamount to writing a one-sided history. For example, in Articles 15 and 19 
of its 2002 Report, the Agenda on the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) observed that  
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The impoverishment of the African continent was 
accentuated primarily by the legacy and effects of slave 
trade, colonialism, the Cold War, the workings of the 
international economic system…for centuries, Africa has 
been integrated into the world economy mainly as a 
supplier of cheap labour and raw materials of necessity; 
this has meant the draining of Africa’s resources rather 
than their use for the continent’s development. The drive 
in that period to use the minerals and raw-materials to 
develop manufacturing industries and a highly skilled 
labour force to sustain growth and development was lost. 
Thus, Africa remains the poorest continent despite being 
one of the most richly endowed regions of the world 
 The above is a one-sided account of the reasons for Africa’s 
underdevelopment but one would not expect an objective view from a forum 
whose members have plundered the resources of their respective states and 
are responsible for the ills afflicting the continent. Indeed, Estevan 
Hernańdez stretched the externalist theory of Africa’s underdevelopment to 
ridiculous extent by claiming that colonialism made it impossible for 
African states “to have the infrastructure to properly respond to a health 
crisis such as Ebola”. 55 Since trying to get a bird fly on only one wing will 
not work; only a robust combination of the two theories can offer a balanced 
discourse on the underdevelopment of Africa. Having briefly examined the 
two main exogenous factors for Africa’s underdevelopment; we will now 
proceed to discuss some of the endogenous factors that have hindered 
Africa’s socio-economic and technological take-off.        
 Scholars seem to agree that the fundamental cause of Africa’s 
underdevelopment is corruption.56 Indeed, in a damning indictment of 
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African political elites and concise summary of the immediate cause of 
Africa’s underdevelopment, the Commission for Africa noted that “Africa 
has suffered from governments that have looted the resources of the state; 
that could not or would not deliver services to their people; that in many 
cases were predatory, corruptly extracting their countries’ resources, that 
maintain control through violence and bribery; and that squandered and 
stolen aid [monies]”.57 As this author recently pointed out, corruption and 
development are antitheses – corruption depletes national resources and 
diverts desperately needed funds from education, healthcare and other social 
services, dislocates the economy and condemns the overwhelming majority 
of the people to illiteracy, hunger, poverty, misery, diseases and death. 
Indeed, since a leader should normally be someone who rules, guides and 
inspires others, an overwhelming majority of those who go by that title in 
Africa are not leaders but litters and vampires who litter their respective 
states with hunger, illiteracy, diseases and death. Instead of building 
infrastructures, developing the economy, funding researches to power and 
fuel technology, innovation and modernization, most African leaders, as 
Moses Mungo has pointed out, “have turned themselves to thieves in 
government houses”.58                 
 Over the last 50 years, Africa is estimated to have lost in excess of $1 
trillion in illicit financial flows (IFFs) – this sum is roughly equivalent to all 
of the official development assistance received by Africa during the same 
timeframe.59 In 1991 alone, more than $200 billion in capital was siphoned 
out of Africa by the ruling elites. This amount was more than half of Africa’s 
foreign debt of $300 billion.60 Currently, Africa is estimated to be losing 
more than $50 billion annually in illicit financial flows of which “bribery and 
theft by corrupt government official” form a substantial portion. Indeed, 
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according to the AU/UNECA Report “these estimates may well fall short of 
reality because accurate data do not exist for all African countries, and these 
estimates often exclude some forms of IFFs that by nature are secret and 
cannot be properly estimated such as proceeds of bribery... The amount lost 
annually by Africa through IFFs is therefore likely to exceed $50 billion by a 
significant amount”.61 The 2002 Africa Union’s Report corroborates the 
above. The Report estimated that Africa lost more than $148 billion annually 
to corruption.  
 Indeed, according to the African Development Bank, in 2004 alone, 
50% of Africa’s tax revenue and $30 billion aid money ended up in private 
pockets. Since the mid 1990s, several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa such 
as Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea have generated enormous 
revenues from the petroleum industry but rather than injecting these 
revenues into the development of what Claire Furphy calls ‘pillars of social 
well-being’62 they ended up as personal earnings of the leaders and their 
cronies thus creating the cruel paradox of enormous wealth; egregious 
poverty. The following are a few instances of massive treasury looting by 
some African leaders while in office as elected or military leaders: General 
Sani Abacha of Nigeria, $20billion; President H. Boigny of Ivory Coast, 
$6billion; General Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria, $5 billion; President 
Mobutu of Zaire, $4billion; President Mouza Traore of Mali, $2billion; 
President Henri Bedie of Ivory Coast, $300million; President Denis 
N’gnesso of Congo, $200million; President Omar Bongo of Gabon, 
$80million; President Paul Biya of Cameroon, $70million; President Haite 
Mariam of Ethiopia, $30million and President Hissene Habre of Chad, 
$3million.63 To these 11 kleptomaniacs, Africa lost well over $37.683billion 
yet about 414 million Africans live on less than $1.25 a day.64 The Global 
Financial Integrity estimated that South Africa lost about $1.4 to “public 
sector corruption between 1994 and 2008” while the figures for 2009 and 
2010 were $538million and $769million respectively.65 Hosni Mubarak of 
Egypt was said to have siphoned more than $40 billion from Egypt during 
his 30-year (1981-2011) regime whereas the AtlanticMonthly of 20 May 
2010 estimated that the combined net worth of all the 44 Presidents of the 
United States of America – from George Washington to Barrack Obama – 
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was $2.7 billion. The normless argument and refrain of dependency 
theorists is that the Europeans did not want African states to develop their 
technology or be able to manufacture goods locally. Except for the United 
Nations’ imposed ‘internal imperialism’ which handed Namibia to South 
Africa and Eritrea to Ethiopia after the Second World War, colonialism had 
virtually crumbed in Africa by 1980 when Zimbabwe gained independence 
from Britain;66 five to six centuries had passed and most African states have 
not been able to adapt or domesticate technology nor are they still able to 
manufacture goods locally owing largely to vampirism and systemic 
corruption. Thus, many African countries have been run aground despite 
their immense natural and human resources. This must have informed the 
description of the form of government practised in most African states as 
lootocracy.67 
 Closely related to the above is the ‘sit-tight’ syndrome in Africa – the 
refusal of African leaders to leave office at the end of their tenures even 
when they had become unpopular and unable to meet the socio-economic 
yearnings of their people. After the attainment of independence, many 
African leaders decanted into one form of authoritarian rule or the other thus 
littering the African political landscape with individuals who wanted power 
though not for the sake of the people. Whether elected into office or they 
accede to power through military coups, many African leaders circumvented 
all extant laws in their countries to monopolize and stay in power 
indefinitely. This ‘sit-down syndrome’ always makes opposition parties to 
device the ‘pull him down syndrome’ and this had had debilitating impact on 
the political stability and socio-economic fortunes of many African states. 
This is because, instead of concentrating on governance and devising means 
and ways of improving the economy, building roads and schools, providing 
healthcare, power and potable water; the sit-tight leader, more often than not, 
is preoccupied with egocentric issues that would not add value to the life of 
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the ordinary man – checkmating and devastating the opposition and media 
white-washing. Also the sit-tight syndrome had led to civil strives and 
military interventions in the democratic processes of many African countries 
since those who make peaceful change impossible make violent change 
inevitable. Unfortunately, even the military, once seen as a sanitizing and 
corrective institution, goaded by the lure of personal gain became a vanguard 
of unbridled self aggrandizement and frenetic looting.68  
 The inviolate disposition of the ruling elite in Africa is self-
aggrandizement and self perpetuation in power and to achieve this, as 
Ayittey has rightly pointed out, African leaders “take over and subvert every 
key institution of government to serve their needs and not that of the people” 
by compromising the Aid service, judiciary, military, media and even the 
banking sector and various commissions with lofty ideals that are supposed 
to be non-partisan and neutral are also taken over and debauched.69 President 
Mobutu Sesé Seko foisted a corrupt and dictatorial regime on Zaire 
(Democratic Republic of Congo) for three decades (1965-1997); Daniel arap 
Moi, whose regime was characterized by massive corruption, held sway in 
Kenya for 24 years (1978-2002); Omar Bongo ruled Gabon for 41 years 
(1967) till his death in 2009. At the time of his death, Bongo was the longest-
serving head of state in Africa and the longest-serving head of government in 
the world; Mathieu Kérékou held Benin captive for 19 years (1972-1991); 
Félix Houphouet-Boigny ruled Cote d’Ivoire for 33 years (1960-1993); 
Denis Sassou–Nguesso has ruled the Republic of Congo for about 40 years 
(1979-1992; since 1997); Robert Mugabe has ruled Zimbabwe for about 35 
years – since independence in 1980; Blaise Campaoré of Burkina Faso was 
forced to resign in October 2014 after 27 years in office; Muammar al-
Qaddafi ruled Libya for 42 years (1969) before he was ousted by a revolt in 
August 2011 while José Eduardo dos Santos has ruled Angola since 1979.70 
From the above, it becomes clear that with the exception of the likes of 
Nelson Mandela of South Africa and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, African 
leaders are not generally inclined to relinquishing power once they get hold 
of it. Unfortunately, these sit-tight leaders often lack the vision to transform 
their respective states and they hold on to power well into old age rather than 
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groom new leaders or allow transfer of power to new generation of leaders. 
One reason for the unwillingness of African leaders to relinquish power is 
their unbridled penchant for stealing. While Daniel arap Moi corruptly 
enriched himself far in excess of $5billion during his 24-year regime;71 
Eduardo dos Santos’ presidency had a budget of $1.8 billion, which was 
more than the funds for the Ministry of Health ($1.5 billion) in the 2013 
Angola’s national budget.72 Indeed, the United Nations Organization 
estimates that about $34 billion was siphoned from Angola’s treasury 
between 1990 and 2008.73 If this figure is divided by Angola’s approximately 
19 million people, each would receive about $1,789 which would make that 
country a middle-income one. It is therefore not surprising that on the 2011 
Human Development Index of the United Nations Development Progamme, 
only three of the thirty lowest ranked countries are not African.  
 One important consequence of the above is the prevalence of civil 
wars in Africa. As a continent, Africa has demonstrated significant levels of 
state fragility and conflict over the past 50 years – of the 54 countries in 
Africa, 48 have endured post-independence armed conflict most of which 
have been intra-state rather than inter-state74 while nearly half of the 32 intra 
and inter–state armed conflicts that occurred worldwide between 2004 and 
2009 took place in Africa.75 Thus, in its year 2000 Yearbook, the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) listed Africa as the most 
conflict ridden region in the world and the only region where armed conflicts 
are on the increase. The relatively high incidence of civil wars in Africa is 
not due to the ethno-linguistic fragmentation of its countries, but rather to 
high levels of poverty, failed political institutions and overdependence on 
natural resources.  While it must be stressed that systemic corruption and the 
sit-tight syndrome are not the exclusive causes of civil wars in Africa; 
available data reveals that a large number of civil wars that had afflicted 
Africa were fuelled by these factors.76 As Veronica Nmoma has pointed out, 
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civil wars in Africa “are proof of political instability which may result from 
breakdown in governance when a people has become...victim of their own 
government’s abuse”.77 Using the Collier-Hoeffler ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ 
theory which postulates that rebels will generally pursue civil war for ‘loot-
seeking’ and ‘justice-seeking’, John Anyanwu has demonstrated the central 
role greed, corruption and injustice play in the outbreak of civil wars in 
Africa.78 This is because in the midst of endemic poverty, African ruling 
elites have corruptly enriched themselves thereby becoming the targets of 
envy of and attacks by other elite groups. Consequently, half of the 
continent’s 54 countries are home to an active conflict or a recently ended 
one. Congo, Somalia, Mozambique, Angola, Sudan, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone, Burundi, Guinea Bissau, Côte d'Ivoire, Chad, Uganda, Togo, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Somalia, Central African Republic, Algeria, Zimbabwe, etc had all 
gone through the throes of civil wars with devastating impacts on the 
demographical and socio-economic fortunes of the respective states in 
particular and the continent in general.  
 A conservative estimate has put the number of Africans killed in 
post-independence insurgencies, conflicts and civil wars at 13.8 million 
whereas the total number of Africans shipped to the Americas and Europe 
during the Atlantic slave trade was about 11 million.79 This implies that in 
the last five to six decades, Africans had robbed the continent of the political, 
social and economic contributions of their fellow men and women more the 
Atlantic slave trade which lasted well over three centuries. For example, 
more than 5 million Congolese died in the Congo civil war;80 more than 2.9 
million and 5.4 million people died in the course of the civil wars in the 
Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo respectively.81 As should be 
expected, apart from heavy human causalities, these wars contribute to the 
spread of diseases, malnutrition, hunger, starvation, socio-economic decline 
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and moral deterioration of African states. Until recently, Sudan was a theater 
of continuous conflict (since 1956). No sooner had the conflict been resolved 
through the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement than another one 
broke out in the western Darfur region. This conflict, described as the 
world’s worst humanitarian disaster, spread into Chad while Somalia earned 
the title of a ‘collapsed state’ following a series of conflicts that left it 
without a central government. This long war, which spread to other countries 
in the Horn – particularly Eritrea and Ethiopia – claimed millions of lives 
and resulted in over 800,000 refugees and over one million internally 
displaced persons. Rout Biel summarized the medical effect of the Sudan 
civil war thus “medicine was either not available or very expensive in many 
hospitals in the North. Many people could not visit a doctor. Today, it is 
becoming more difficult to go to a doctor. Meanwhile, the health situation in 
the South broke down completely. There is no single [functional] hospital in 
the South”.82    
 An outgrowth of the pervasive civil wars in Africa is the ubiquitous 
problem of internal displacement and large number of refugees. Because of 
internecine conflicts and wars, Africa accounts for about 50% of the world’s 
refugees, surpassing the population of some individual African nations. In 
the 1990s, more than 160 million Africans lived in war-torn states while 
three million of them were killed in the course of such conflicts83 and by 
1993, there were more than 6 million refugees in Africa.84 A case in point is 
the Liberian civil war which displaced about 1.28 million or half of Liberia’s 
population.85 Apparently, refugees and internally displaced persons are 
mentally and psychologically traumatized, emotionally sapped, economically 
cremated and most times medically challenged thereby making it impossible 
for them to make tangible contribution to the socio-economic development 
of a state or region. Indeed, more than the Atlantic slave trade, civil wars had 
probably removed more Africans from their professions and vocations – the 
farmer from the farm, the doctor from the hospital, the teacher from the 
classroom, the trader from the stall, the engineer from site and the driver 
from the road. Thus denied of the socio-economic contribution of millions of 
prospective anchors of its development, it is not surprising that Africa 
remains the only continent that continues to experience socio-economic 
stagnation, famine and hunger in the 21st century.  
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Conclusion 
 For rather too long, proponents of the dependency or modernization 
theory of Africa’s underdevelopment have overstretched the role of 
exogamous factors, particularly the Atlantic slave trade and colonialism, in 
the underdevelopment of Africa. Although, as this paper has pointed out, the 
theory has some merit because while the Atlantic slave trade arrested the 
demographical growth of Africa and rendered the preconditions for socio-
economic and technological take off thoroughly unattainable for more than 
three centuries; colonialism disarticulated African economy, established a 
primary product export oriented economy and stifled productive economic 
ventures. Indeed, both phenomena prevented Africa from going beyond 
stage one of W. Rostow’s five stages of growth. But, if the Atlantic slave 
trade and colonialism hindered Africa’s socio-economic and technological 
development; endogamous factors, particularly systemic corruption and 
vampirism, utter disregard for democratic ideals and the sit-tight syndrome, 
political instability and pervasive civil wars have rendered African states 
economically and technologically immobile since independence. Large 
sums of money that are sufficient to catapult Africa to enviable economic 
and technological plain if channelled into economically productive ventures, 
end up in private pockets. If colonialism was a one-armed bandit; most 
African leaders were/are two-armed bandits, spendthrifts, pillagers and 
plunderers. Thus, several decades after the attainment of independence, 
most Africans do not have access to power supply, potable water, good road 
network, qualitative healthcare and education, etc.  
 As a result of pervasive civil wars fuelled mostly by egocentric 
reasons, a perpetual atmosphere of insecurity is hung on the continent. Thus, 
instead of concentrating on governance, provision of basic social utilities 
and realization of the economic and technological development of their 
respective states; most African leaders concentrate on prosecuting civil wars 
with its attendant drain on state resources.86 Apparently, a war-torn state or 
region repels rather than attracts investment and is characterized by political 
upheavals and instability which are at cross-purposes with development. A 
corollary to the above is incessant military coups and counter-coups which 
disrupt the democratic process of most African states. For example, by 
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1984, twenty-four of the continent’s fifty-one independent states were under 
military regimes87 and between July 1952 when Colonel Gamel Abdul 
Nasser swept King Farouk off the seat of power and April 2012, when the 
last coup in Guinea Bissau took place, there were a total of 88 successful 
and 108 unsuccessful coups in Africa.88 Indeed, in the extreme case of 
Guinea Bissau, no president has completed a full term in office since the 
country became independent in 1974.89 Thus, in 2004 the chairman of the 
African Union Commission, Alpha Omar Konare, reminded an African 
Union summit that the continent had experienced 186 coups and 26 major 
wars. Consequently, the continent is littered with millions of refugees and 
internally displaced persons who are thoroughly economically cremated, 
psychologically traumatised, physically sapped and medically challenged so 
that they are unable to make any meaningful contribution to the socio-
economic development of Africa. These endogamous factors are the 
fundamental causes of Africa’s underdevelopment.  
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